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The Chilean experience with price-based capital account
regulations (i.e., deposits or reserve requirements on capital inflows)
has been subject to extensive discussion in the recent literature. This
paper presents evidence on the effectiveness of similar regulations in
Colombia since September 1993, when traditional exchange controls
were replaced by price-based regulations. It is important to emphasize
that the Tobin tax equivalent of such regulations in Colombia has been
quite high (13.6% and 6.4% tax for 12 and 36 months loans,
respectively, in 1994-1998), and, as in Chile, it is certainly much
higher than the rates suggested for an international Tobin tax. The
econometric evidence presented indicates that these regulations have
been effective in Colombia, both in terms of reducing the volume of
flows and in improving the term structure of external borrowing. This
indicates that price-based regulations give the authorities some room
for maneuver to adopt restrictive monetary policies during
international capital market booms. They have also been effective in
improving the debt profile of the country, a crucial determinant of
macroeconomic risks in the face of busts in the international capital




The East Asian crisis has raised an intense debate regarding the
policy options that emerging markets can use to maintain
macroeconomic stability and to avoid financial crises when opening
their capital accounts. There is now widespread agreement on the fact
that the abrupt or premature liberalization of capital markets is
inappropriate for emerging economies, in particular if they are not
complemented by strong prudential regulation and supervision of
domestic financial systems. Liberalizing the capital account creates
incentives for domestic agents to expand foreign financial transactions
without adequately assessing the risks involved in these operations.
These risks are exacerbated by the fact that capital markets are
imperfect, which in turn induces a highly volatile behavior of capital
flows to developing countries. Boom-bust cycles impose a severe
threat to both macroeconomic stability and the stability of domestic
financial systems.
1
The Asian crisis, as well as the “tequila crisis” and previous
events, have thus made evident the need for developing and transition
economies to adopt a set of policies that can help them maintain
macroeconomic stability while opening their capital accounts. When
experiencing a surge in capital inflows, developing countries have
reacted with a wide spectrum of policies, such as fiscal austerity
measures, discrete revaluations of the nominal exchange rate, greater
exchange rate flexibility, measures to curb consumer credit and
consumption activity, sterilized intervention, trade liberalization or
the liberalization of  capital outflows. However, many of these policies
                                                          
1 See ECLAC (1995), IMF (1998), UNCTAD (1998), World Bank (1998), Akyüz and Cornford (1999), Dornbush (1998), Eatwell and
Taylor (1999), Eichengreen (1999), Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Griffith-Jones (1998), Helleiner (1997), Ocampo (1999a, 1999b),
Reinhart and Dunaway (1996), Rodrik (1998), Rodrik and Velasco (1999), Taylor (1998), and Wyplosz (1999).Price-based capital account regulations: the Colombian experience
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have proved to be ineffective for managing the pressures imposed by capital inflows. This has
called attention to the use of capital account regulations on inflows as a potentially effective
mechanism for managing capital surges.
It has been argued that price-based controls or regulations on capital inflows, known in the
recent debate as Chilean-type capital-inflow taxes, help to reduce the destabilizing effects of surges
in capital inflows.
2 These arguments are based on the assumption that such regulations improve the
term structure of external liabilities by strongly discouraging short-term capital inflows, which are
more volatile than long-term flows and are a major source of instability for the financial system.
Whether such a tax on capital inflows reduces net global capital flows, and thus alleviates exchange
rate pressures, is a matter of debate.
The Chilean experience has been widely analysed in the recent literature.
3 The Colombian
experience, in contrast, has not received much attention. This paper provides further empirical
evidence of the effectiveness of price-based regulation on capital inflows, based on the Colombian
experience since 1993. Using alternative methods, the paper demonstrates that Colombia’s
regulations have not only created a more sound term structure of external liabilities, but have also
reduced the volume of capital inflows.
The paper is organized in six sections, the first of which is this introduction. Section II briefly
discusses the supporting arguments for the use of price-based regulations on capital inflows. Section
III describes such regulations in Colombia during the 1990s. Section IV presents an econometric
evidence on the determinants of the magnitude of capital flows, aimed at analyzing the
effectiveness of such regulations in Colombia. The fifth section presents evidence of their effect on
the term structure of external liabilities. The final section draws conclusions.
                                                          
2 Eichengreen and Rose (1998), Furman and Stiglitz (1998) and Williamson and Mahar (1998).
3 Agosin (1998), Agosin and Ffrench-Davis (1996 and 1999), Edwards (1998), Le Fort and Budnevich (1977), Valdés-Prieto and Soto
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II. What role for price-based capital
account regulations?
Many developing and transition countries have now liberalized
their capital accounts. This process offers potential benefits, but
experience indicates that it also poses major risks. Indeed, the threat of
macroeconomic and domestic financial crises following the
liberalization of the capital account appears to be a major drawback of
the process. In this regard, developing countries have become
increasingly interested in the policy options available to adequately
manage surges in capital flows. The lessons from recent financial
crises suggest that the successful management of capital flows during
boom periods requires the adoption of policy measures in three main
areas. First, policy makers must adopt consistent and flexible
macroeconomic management. Second, developing countries will have
to improve prudential regulation and supervision of their domestic
financial systems. Third, as the recent and previous crises have
demonstrated, they must adopt strong “liability policies” aimed at
inducing good public and private debt profiles, for both domestic and
external commitments.
This general prescription is not easily attainable. The traditional
instruments of macroeconomic management are deficient when dealing
with large capital inflows. Such is the case for fiscal, monetary and
exchange rate policies. Fiscal policies are difficult to fine tune:
tax reforms  must  be  passed  by  Congress;  active  expenditure
policies take time to implement and may generate inefficiencies (e.g.,
increased costs associated with the uneven rate of execution of public
investment projects). Furthermore, in an open economic
environment,monetary and exchange rate policies pose large dilemmasPrice-based capital account regulations: the Colombian experience
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for policy makers, related to the “eternal triangle”, i.e., the fact that  in an open economy  it is not
possible  to achieve  monetary control and exchange rate control at the  same time. Sterilized
intervention tends to be partially self-defeating in this context, and excessive appreciation during
booms may generate “Dutch disease” effects and increase the likelihood of speculative attacks on
the domestic currency.
4
Microeconomic policies, such as improved prudential regulations and supervision of
domestic financial systems, also play an important role in avoiding the destabilizing effects of
capital flows and, more generally, of financial booms. Although desirable and necessary, such
policies have important shortcomings.
5 It is widely recognized that financial markets are imperfect
and are exposed to information asymmetries. They are therefore intrinsically prone to financial
crises, even if governed by refined regulatory and supervision systems.
6 The development of an
adequate regulatory framework is not an easy task; it usually takes time to develop and requires
advanced information systems. Even when such frameworks are available, they normally lag behind
financial innovations. The close association between financial risks and macroeconomic variables,
such as interest and exchange rates, indicates that even well-designed systems of prudential
regulation and supervision may prove powerless in the face of major macroeconomic shocks.
7
Finally, prudential regulation and supervision generally have pro-cyclical effects associated with the
fact that bad debts only become evident during crises, when capital-adequacy requirements induce a
strong contraction of credit which may increase rather than reduce credit risks.
8
Finally, the experience of many developing countries indicates that crises are associated not
only with high debt ratios but also with inadequate debt profiles.
9 Under severe uncertainty, such as
that which characterizes financial busts, markets respond to gross and not to net financing
requirements. In other words, the rollover of short-term debt is not neutral in financial terms. This
gives an essential role to liability policies aimed at improving debt profiles. Although such policies
should aim to improve external debt profiles, there is a strong complementarity between good
external and domestic debt profiles. Indeed, the consequences of excessive domestic short-term
borrowing can be serious: a government trying to roll over the domestic debt during a crisis may be
forced to raise interest rates in order to avoid capital flight by (direct or indirect) foreign investors in
government bonds. Also, excessively high private short-term liabilities increase the risks perceived
by foreign lenders during crises, a fact that may cause a stronger contraction of external lending.
It is in this context that regulating capital inflows may play a complementary and preventive
role when dealing with the destabilizing effects of capital surges. In the case of the public sector,
direct controls by the Ministry of Finance are probably the adequate instrument of a liability policy.
In the case of the private sector, however, direct controls are more debatable because of the
distortions (or corruption) that they may generate. In this regard, indirect price-based policy tools,
such as the reserve requirements on capital inflows used by Colombia and Chile during the 1990s,
appear to be an interesting option. Reserve requirements or price-based capital regulations may be
considered particular types of Tobin taxes (and also of interest equalization taxes), as they can be
substituted for a payment to the central bank which is equivalent to the opportunity cost of the
reserve requirement. Nonetheless, the equivalent tax level (3% for a 12-month credit in the case of
Chile and, as we will see, an even higher rate in Colombia) is much higher than that proposed for an
international Tobin tax.
                                                          
4 See Krugman (1998), Ocampo (1999a), and World Bank (1998).
5 For a more detailed survey see Furman and Stiglitz (1998).
6 This fact has become evident as banks have begun to operate in derivatives, which means that a bank’s exposures can vary hourly as
a result of changes in both the market position and market prices of the assets in which it trades. See Williamson and Mahar (1998).
7 Akyüz and Cornford (1999), Ocampo (1999b).
8 Ocampo (1999b).
9 For a theoretical approach on the role of debt profile as a factor behind financial crises, see Rodrik and Velasco (1999).CEPAL – SERIE Financiamiento del desarrollo N
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Such regulations have positive effects on debt profiles, as there is a strong incentive to spread
the additional costs of reserve requirement over a longer period. The effect of this system on the
magnitude of flows has been the subject of a more heated controversy. In any case, to the extent that
short-term and long-term borrowing are not perfect substitutes, and that evasion and elusion are
costly (e.g., the derivative operations used for that purpose are costly), the volume of capital flows is
also affected.
10 In this case, the system operates both as a liability policy and a macroeconomic
policy tool. It reduces the pressures on monetary aggregates and on real and nominal exchange
rates, which in turn allows policy makers to gain monetary and exchange control when experiencing
capital surges, thereby reducing the destabilizing effects of a sudden reversal in capital flows.
A major advantage of this instrument is that it is targeted at capital inflows, and it is thus a
preventive policy tool. It also has specific advantages over prudential regulations and supervision
practices which could have similar effects: it affects both financial and non-financial agents, and it
uses a non-discretionary price instrument, whereas prudential regulations affect only financial
intermediaries and are usually quantitative in their character, and supervision is essentially
discretionary in its operation.
11 Given the strong externalities that large non-financial agents can
have on the domestic financial system during crises, controlling them is a substantial advantage.
                                                          
10 Agosin (1998), Agosin and Ffrench Davis (1999) and Ocampo and Tovar (1998).
11 Ocampo (1999a, 1999b).CEPAL – SERIE financiamiento del desarrollo N
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III. Colombian capital account
regulations
An important liberalization of foreign exchange transactions
occurred in Colombia in the 1990s along with a fairly complete
liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI),
12 but significant
regulations on capital flows remain. The liberalization of foreign exchange
regulations took place in two stages. The first stage was associated with
Law 9 of 1991 and its related Resolution 57, which the Monetary Board
issued in June 1991. Both made major changes to the exchange control
system that had been established by Decree 444 of 1967, which regulated
foreign exchange transactions in Colombia for a quarter of a century. The
major innovation was a decentralization of foreign exchange transactions:
financial intermediaries could manage such transactions without prior
controls by the central bank; the reform also allowed firms a fairly general
use of bank accounts abroad to manage foreign exchange revenues and
expenditures. However, most transactions continued to be highly
regulated, including the obligation to channel them through intermediaries
legally allowed to operate in the market. With respect to capital
transactions, Resolution 57 established a minimum maturity of one year
for foreign loans, except for some commercial credits; it also maintained
strong regulations on the final use of external lending (investment, exports
and imports) and some sectoral discriminations. In all these respects, the
1991 regulations maintained great continuity with those that had existed
since 1967. The major innovation in this area was probably Resolution 7,
issued by the new independent central bank board in February 1992,
which for the first time allowed firms to contract foreign credits for short-
term working capital.
                                                          
12  Since 1991, prior approval is only required for foreign direct investment in utilities, large mining activities, investment funds and
banking; in the latter case, it is also required for domestic investors. Remittances by foreign companies are not subject to restrictions.
In 1994, some restrictions were introduced on the purchase of real estate by foreigners.Price-based capital account regulations: the Colombian experience
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The second stage stemmed from the central bank board’s Resolution 21 of September 1993. This
reform made a more important change with respect to capital transactions: it transformed a system of
regulations of capital flows based on their final use into a system based on their maturity. Most
importantly, domestic financial intermediaries could for the first time lend in foreign currency to
domestic firms and residents with no regard for the final use of those credits. This was accompanied by
an extension of the requirement that all debts in foreign currency must be registered in the central bank
(Banco de la República); this requirement did not exist for short-term commercial debts prior to that
date. Resolution 21 also allowed domestic financial intermediaries to lend to foreigners in international
currencies and to invest abroad in liquid assets.
Specifically, the new system required that all loans of less than certain maturity ¾which we
will call the minimum maturity— keep a dollar-denominated deposit in the central bank at a
pre-specified rate and holding period. This deposit resembles a reserve requirement, an interest
equalization tax or a Tobin tax; the latter interpretation is highlighted by the fact that the deposit could
be immediately redeemed at preestablished discount rates. As table 1 indicates, minimum maturities
and deposit requirements varied over time: they became more restrictive in March and August 1994,
were lessened in February and March 1996, and became more restrictive again in March 1997.
In January 1997, the Government established an explicit Tobin tax on all capital inflows, in
addition to the reserve requirement. In March 1997, the Tobin tax was decreed unconstitutional, but
reserve requirements were tightened. In May 1997, the central bank introduced a simpler system,
more similar to that used by Chile. A flat deposit in local currency with an 18-month maturity was
decreed for all loans. For the sake of simplicity in administration, the principle of a minimum
maturity was thus abandoned, and dollar deposits were substituted for peso-denominated ones. In
January and September 1998, the deposit rate and holding periods were reduced in response to
pressures from the world financial crises (see table 1).
Under the price-based deposit system, incentives to borrow in foreign currencies depend on
both the differential between the domestic and the external interest rate (cum expected devaluation)
and the opportunity costs of the deposits. As shown in the Appendix, the tax equivalent of the
deposits depends on three factors: (a) the deposit rate; (b) the relation between the maturity of the
loan and that of the deposit; and (c) between September 1993 and May 1997, when deposits were
dollar-denominated, their opportunity cost increased (decreased) if domestic interest rates rose (fell)
or if the rate of devaluation decreased (increased). It should be emphasized that the last effect was
contrary to the direct effect of devaluation on the costs of foreign borrowing. In this sense, the tax
had a (partial) stabilizing effect on the costs of foreign borrowing: it increased when the direct costs
of such borrowing were reduced due to a slow rate of devaluation, but had the opposite effect when
devaluation accelerated. However, this stabilizing feature was lost after May 1997, when the dollar
deposit system was replaced by the peso deposit system.
Panel A of figure 1 shows the total costs of loans with maturities of 6, 12, 18, 24 and 36
months, compared to the typical 90-day deposit rate. Panel B shows the tax equivalent of deposits
for the same maturities. Regulations were not very restrictive prior to August 1994, except for
short-term debts (6 and 12 months). After August 1994, the cost of borrowing in foreign currency
increased significantly for all maturities, a tendency which the acceleration of devaluation in the
second semester of 1995 reinforced. Nonetheless, as noted, the tax equivalent of deposits actually
declined when devaluation accelerated. The new rules established in February and March 1996
reduced the relative costs of borrowing in external markets, but kept them high for short-term
maturities. In January 1997, the cost of foreign borrowing became very restrictive for short-term
capital inflows due to the introduction of the explicit Tobin tax and to revaluation. The return to the
previous system in March contributed to its decline, however. By mid-1997, the costs of foreign
borrowing rapidly increased again as devaluation rose. Some moderation of devaluation pressures,
together with the significant easing of capital account regulations in September 1998, led to a



















































REGULATIONS ON EXTERNAL BORROWING






1991 January based on the final use of
the loan
1993 September with maturity under 18
months
47% 12 months US dollars
1994 March with maturity under 36
months according to a table
93% less than 12 months 12 months US dollars
64% between 12 and 24
months
50% between 24 and 36
months
August based on the maturity of
the loan
with maturity under 60








1996 February with maturity under 48
months
US dollars
according to a table
March with maturity under 36
months
50% 18 months US dollars
1997 January explicit Tobin tax
(additional to the
deposit)
all variable according to interest rate
differential
March based on the maturity of
the loan
With maturity under 60
months
50% 18 months US dollars
May all 30% 18 months Colombian pesos
1998 January Flat all 25% 12 months Colombian pesos
September all 10% 6 months Colombian pesosPrice-based capital account regulations: the Colombian experience
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Figure 1
TOTAL COSTS OF EXTERNAL BORROWING WITH DEPOSIT SYSTEM
B. Tax equivalent of deposits
C. Nominal annual devaluation











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6M 12M 18M 24M 36M 90-day deposit rate 
A. Effects of deposits on the relative cost of borrowingCEPAL: - SERIE Financiamiento del desarrollo  N
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Aside from reserve requirements, capital inflows in Colombia have been subject to four
additional types of regulation.
13 (1) Restrictions on commercial debts include rules on maximum
payment periods for imports of consumer and intermediate goods, which set a maximum maturity
for the related commercial credits. Export prefinancing is subject to special quotas for the Foreign
Trade Bank (Bancoldex) and coffee exporters, which have been subject to smaller deposit
requirements and, in some periods, have been free from them. (2) Controls on the net foreign
exchange assets of financial intermediaries (posición propia) have banned the holding of negative
net foreign exchange assets, thus prohibiting intermediaries from using external funds to lend in
pesos. By forcing intermediaries to hold positive net foreign assets during some periods of expected
exchange rate appreciation, the authorities have increased the costs of intermediating foreign
exchange loans and the demand for foreign exchange. (3) Complementary regulations also affect
capital flows. Foreign investment funds operating in Colombia are subject to direct approval by the
Superintendency of Securities (Superintendencia de Valores), and several taxes and explicit
controls serve to reduce interest arbitrage which may be filtered through service transactions.
(4) Direct controls on illegal flows of funds.
                                                          
13 For details, see Ocampo and Tovar (1998).CEPAL: - SERIE Financiamiento del desarrollo  N
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IV. Magnitude and determinants of
capital flows
Figure 2 and table 2 summarize the evolution of Colombia’s
external financing and foreign debt. Figure 2 contains three noticeable
features. First, annual financing requirements during the 1990s, as
measured by the current account deficit as a proportion of gross
domestic product (GDP) (estimated at 1994 parity exchange rates), are
smaller than the peak level of the early 1980s, but they have remained
high for a longer time period. Second, FDI has become a major stable
source of financing, covering about half of the total financing
requirements in recent years. The boom in oil investments is part of the
story, but equally important is the FDI boom in non-tradable activities,
primarily those which were liberalized in the early 1990s (e.g.,
domestic commerce, public utilities, domestic financing). Third, net
short-term capital flows have played a secondary role; indeed, in many
years, they have been negative. Thus, for practical purposes, the
current account deficit has been financed by long-term funds,




(Percentage of GDP at 1994 parity exchange rate)
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Banco de la República data.
As table 2 indicates, the decline of the (moderate) debt ratios of Colombia that had
characterized the second half of the 1980s continued in the early 1990s. Since 1992, however, they
have experienced an increasing trend. Private and public external debts evolved differently. Most of
the increase in the external debt of Colombia throughout the 1990s has been related to private sector
borrowing. Whereas public sector debt ratios have declined throughout the decade, those of the
private sector have increased and since 1996 have more than doubled the levels reached in 1986, at
the end of the debt boom that started in the late 1970s.
Important changes have also occurred in the composition of both private and public foreign
debts. In the case of the private sector, the ratio of short-term to total external liabilities has
remained low. The ratio of short-term debt to international reserves has also stayed at moderate
levels by international standards.
14 The latter ratio experienced a short but sharp deterioration as a
result of the capital-account liberalization in 1993, and both ratios improved as a result of the active
use of price-based regulations. In the case of the public sector, long-term liabilities have been
dominant throughout the decade. Major changes include the rise of bond financing and the relative
decline of bilateral debt; among multilateral lenders, the Inter-American Development Bank has
replaced the World Bank as the major source of financing.
The determinants of private capital flows have been the focus of much attention in the 1990s.
However, most of the literature covers periods under which the exchange controls prevailed.
15
Cárdenas and Barrera (1997) provide one of the few studies to incorporate the period following
the  liberalization adopted in September 1993. Using monthly data for 1985 through mid-1996,
they  analyse the  effectiveness of price-based capital account regulations. Their results show
that  these regulations have  been effective in changing the composition of capital inflows
for long-term maturities. However, the authors question their effectiveness in reducing the volume
of flows, based on three different statistical results: (1) flows are not dependent on interest rate
differentials when those differentials are estimated using the tax equivalent for shorter-term deposits
                                                          
14  This is particularly true if compared with Asia, where the ratio easily exceeded 100%. See Rodrik and Velasco (1999).
15 A central issue in the discussion has therefore involved whether interest arbitrage filtered through exchange controls. In general,
evidence supports the presence of interest arbitrage and the sensivity of capital flows to interest rate differentials. See Cárdenas and









































































(Millions of US dollars
1978 1986 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
a
Private debt 1584 3318 3027 2532 3256 5056 7122 9372 13262 15591 15725
     Short-term 1221 1711 1914 1551 2006 3009 3218 3819 3793 3831 3979
     Long-term 363 1607 1113 981 1250 2046 3904 5553 9469 11760 11746
Public sector debt 2896 12463 14586 14464 13487 13886 14718 15540 16251 16424 17140
     Multilateral 1108 4596 6021 6174 5886 5728 5614 5649 5053 4448 4661
     Bilateral 992 2357 2707 2571 2165 1803 1496 1747 1738 1591 1478
     Commercial banks 523 4865 4719 4536 4304 4293 4574 4307 4430 4613 4697
     Bonds 45 46 275 359 419 776 1333 1733 3410 4441 5863
     Suppliers 228 599 864 824 713 659 537 516 451 427 441
Total 4480 15781 17613 16996 16743 18315 21157 24912 29513 32015 32865
Debt as % of exports
of goods and services 125.4 251.5 207.8 190.6 188.4 194.8 192.1 192.3 211.8 211.6 235.0
     Private 39.3 51.8 35.0 27.8 35.5 52.1 66.7 76.6 95.3 103.0 109.6
     Public 86.0 199.7 172.8 162.7 152.9 142.7 125.4 115.7 116.5 108.5 125.5
Private short-term debt as %
of total private debt 77.1 51.6 63.2 61.3 61.6 59.5 48.5 44.1 28.6 24.6 25.3
Private short-term debt as %
of international reserves 49.2 49.2 42.5 24.2 26.0 38.2 46.0 52.5 38.3 38.8 45.5
Source: Banco de la República.
a Data as of September.Price-based capital account regulations: the Colombian experience
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(18 and 24 months);
16 (2) the market showed signs of speculative behavior prior to and after the
adoption of policy decisions, which is reflected in an unexpected increase in inflows as captured by
specific dummy variables; and (3) control measures had no permanent effect, as reflected in the lack
of significance of the coefficients for dummy variables which cover the whole period for which
specific control measures were in place. The exception to the last rule is a dummy covering the
period January 1995-June 1996, which the authors interpret as a “tequila” effect. Some of these
results are open to different interpretations, however, as shown below.
Ocampo and Tovar (1998) offer an alternative study on the effectiveness of price-based
capital account regulations. Using monthly data from January 1990 to December 1996, they found
that the regulations were effective in reducing the volume of capital flows as well as in altering their
term structure. Contrary to Cárdenas and Barrera (1997), they found evidence of interest arbitrage
when including the tax equivalent for short-term deposits (18 and 36 months). Furthermore, tests for
the temporary effects of different policy decisions, using dummy variables, indicated that stock
adjustments occurred following the February 1992 and September 1993 liberalizations. They also
found evidence of a strong speculative wave prior to the adoption of the August 1994 restrictions.
Nonetheless, the August 1994 measure had a delayed direct effect, which reduced capital inflows by
a larger volume than additional inflows related to the speculative wave. This result supports a
different interpretation from Cárdenas and Barrera’s “tequila effect”. Indeed, the spreads on
sovereign bonds suggest that the tequila crisis had a minor effect on Colombia, and aggregate net
flows to Latin America indicate that the contagion effects of the crisis only covered the first quarter
of 1995.
Ocampo and Tovar (1998) also suggest that controls have been effective in determining the
term structure of private debt. They show that debt maturities clearly increased as a result of the
March and August 1994 regulations, which raised the minimum maturity for deposit-free loans
from 18 months to three years and then to five years. The return to a three-year minimum maturity
in March 1996 had the opposite effect.
Cárdenas and Barrera (1997) and Ocampo and Tovar (1998) also examined whether interest
rate arbitrage filtered through the service and trade accounts. Cárdenas and Barrera used the
residuals of the correlation between the service account and activity variables as a proxy for capital
flows, which were then explained by interest rate differentials and the black market premium. This
methodology yielded evidence of interest arbitrage for the service account, but not for trade
financing. However, this result was only obtained for regressions incorporating the cost of deposits
for medium- and long-term loans, as well as for a global measure of capital flows including cash
flows, transfers and the temporary component of the non-financial services balance. Cárdenas and
Barrera (1994) found similar results in an earlier study.
In contrast, Ocampo and Tovar (1998) followed a procedure previously used by Correa
(1984), in which interest rate differentials are used as a determinant of capital flows together with
other “fundamental” determinants of the service account (i.e., domestic activity variables, the real
exchange rate and the ratio of the official to the black market exchange rate, which captures foreign
exchange arbitrage between the black and the official markets). In Ocampo and Tovar’s analysis,
activity variables emerged as the major determinants of trade financing and of the non-financial
services balance. Interest rate differentials did not appear to be relevant for any of these accounts.
Furthermore, dummy variables did not produce evidence of either a reduction of hidden transactions
after the September 1993 liberalization or an increase in such flows following the August 1994
controls.
                                                          
16 The formula used by Cárdenas and Barrera to measure the tax equivalent is different to that proposed in the Appendix to this paper,
and is thus imprecise. See also footnote 18 below.CEPAL – SERIE Financiamiento del desarrollo N
o 87
23
The analysis developed in this paper will center exclusively on the determinants of private
cash capital flows (K), as measured by the balance of cash foreign exchange flows (balanza
cambiaria).
17 The analysis uses two basic econometric methodologies: a Johansen framework and a
Kalman filter. In the first case, the basic relation estimated and the expected signs are as follows:
(1) ( ) R a m K K , ,
+ + =
where imports of capital goods (m) is assumed to be the main activity variable, a is
interest-arbitrage factor, including the effects of deposits, and R stands for regulations (see below).
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where i is the domestic deposit rate, i
* the United States deposit rate and d
e the expected nominal
devaluation; for simplicity, it is assumed that expected devaluation equals the annualized
devaluation of the past 12 months.
18 When deposits are in place, the arbitrage factor includes the













The precise expression for j is derived in the Appendix. The regressions use values of j for
credits with maturities of 18 and 36 months.
R stands for dummy variables used to test for the discrete effects of changes in capital
account regulation. The interpretation of these dummies depends on whether the regulations
liberalized the capital account (e.g., February 1992, September 1993, February-March 1996, March
1997, January and September 1998) or increased controls (e.g., March and August 1994, January
1997, and May 1997). In the first case, a positive coefficient can be interpreted as a stock
adjustment induced by the liberalization measure. In the second case, the coefficient reflects either
speculative attacks against controls (if positive) or the discrete effects of controls (if negative). Two
different dummies are used to capture the restrictive regulations of the August 1994-February 1996
period. There were significant debt registrations in the weeks prior to the introduction of the August
1994 regulations (Banco de la República, 1995), which were associated with expectations that the
incoming Samper Administration would propose stronger regulations to the central bank. These
registrations reduced the effects of controls for some months after regulations were introduced. A
temporary dummy for September-December 1994 thus captures this speculative effect, whereas the
actual dummy variable used to capture the effects of the August 1994 regulations only starts in
January 1995. As mentioned above, this dummy variable cannot be interpreted as a tequila effect,
which was short and had no major effect on spreads on Colombian bonds in international markets.
Additional dummies were used to test for temporary effects from the tequila, Asian and Russian
crises, but they were not statistically significant in the estimations. Finally, a particular dummy was
                                                          
17 This balance differs from normal balance of payment accounts in that trade financing, which does not involve cash flows, is not
registered in the capital account. Rather, exports and imports are registered at the time at which they are effectively paid for.
18  Shorter time spans yield similar results.Price-based capital account regulations: the Colombian experience
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used for December 1996, an outlier in the series, which may be interpreted as a speculative attack
on the floor of the exchange rate band (see below).
The procedure used to capture the effects of regulations involves two different channels: the
additional cost of borrowing, which affects capital flows through the arbitrage factor,
19 and a
discrete effect of regulations, estimated with dummy variables. As pointed out in Section II, the
latter may be interpreted as evidence of imperfect substitution between loans of different maturities,
due to risk factors on the supply side that affect their relative availability. It may also be interpreted
as the effect of the additional costs of circumventing regulations (e.g., the costs of the derivative
operations used for that purpose, or the risks of exchange control supervision and penalties if they
are hidden in trade transactions). The first of these interpretations is preferred in the analysis below.
Figure 3 presents the basic data for interest rate differentials and private cash capital flows.
Major incentives for inflows were present from the second quarter of 1991 through mid-1992, from
the third quarter of 1993 through the second quarter of 1995 and from mid-1996 to the third quarter
of 1997 (see figure 3, panel A). The deposit system was quite effective in reducing incentives to
borrow in foreign currencies after March 1994 and in eliminating them altogether after the August
1994 regulations were introduced. Global incentives to borrow abroad actually turned negative
when devaluation accelerated in the third quarter of 1995. The joint effect of regulations and faster
devaluation explains the sharp interruption of cash capital flows in 1995 (see figure 3, panel B).
Liberalization of controls in February-March 1996, together with revaluation, led to a new wave of
capital inflows in the second semester of 1996. By late 1996, the economy faced large capital
inflows, which threatened to destabilize the economy. Indeed, high interest rate differentials in the
second half of the year contributed to build a speculative attack on the floor of the exchange rate
band. In January 1997, the Government adopted explicit Tobin taxes to contain capital inflows,
which were followed by the March and May capital account regulations adopted by the central
bank. These policy decisions contributed to reducing interest rate differentials and reversing the
speculative pressures on the exchange rate band. Capital flows fell rapidly. By mid-1997, prior to
the Asian crisis, the regulations seemed to have been effective in inducing an important devaluation.
As a result, interest rate differentials rapidly turned negative and capital flows were stabilized at
moderate levels.
Tables 3 and 4 summarize econometric results using monthly data for 1990-1998. To avoid
the possible effects of capital flows on the exchange rate and, thus, on interest rate differentials, the
latter variable is always included with a one-month lag. Table 3 presents the rank test for
cointegration vectors for equations reported in table 4. As shown, cash capital flows, interest rate
differentials and imports of capital goods are cointegrated. The long-term cointegration vectors
reported in table 4 were calculated using the effective costs of borrowing at maturities of 18 and 36
months. These results strongly indicate that private cash capital flows are sensitive to interest rate
differentials. The parameters of the error correction mechanism suggest that disequilibria in the
long-term relationship among the three variables are rapidly and exclusively adjusted by cash
capital flows. This implies that price-based capital account regulations which alter the long-term
relationship will have a rapid effect on the dynamics of cash capital flows, and that pressures on
fundamental macroeconomic variables can therefore be effectively reduced by policies aimed at
altering the interest rate differentials.
                                                          
19 This effect is not included in the interpretation of the regression results in Cárdenas and Barrera (1997), and thus leads them to




INTEREST RATE DIFFERENTIALS AND CASH CAPITAL FLOWS
A. Interest rate differentials (36-month loans)
B. Cash capital flows (millions of US dollars)
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Table 3
RANK TEST FOR COINTEGRATION VECTORS
Eigen value L-max Trace Ho: r N-r
Equation 1
0.47 66.6 * 82.6 * 0 3
0.10 11.2 15.3 1 2
0.04 4.8 4.8 2 1
Equation 2
0.47 67.3 * 83.2 * 0 3
0.10 11.5 15.4 1 2
0.04 4.4 4.4 2 1
Equation 3
0.46 65.1 * 81.0 * 0 3
0.09 10.0 15.4 1 2
0.05 6.0 6.0 2 1
Equation 4
0.46 64.8 * 81.5 * 0 3
0.10 11.6 15.5 1 2
0.04 5.2 5.2 2 1
Note: Cointegration vectors are presented in Table 4.
Lags in all Var-models : 2.
No. Observations: 106.
* Indicates statistical significance at 5% levels.
Table 5 presents the estimated effects of interest rate differentials on capital flows and the net
effect generated by the deposit system for representative phases in the history of capital account
regulations. In their absence, cash capital flows would have increased during the period in which
price-based capital controls have been in place, particularly in September 1994-January 1996
(US$74 million per month), as well as in April-August 1994 (US$56 million per month) and in




















































DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL FLOWS
(January 1990 - December 1998)
Johansen cointegration analysis









   Cash Capital Flows 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
   Interest rate differential
        (36 months loans) -393.16 -463.04
        (18 months loans) -300.93 -362.55
   Imports of capital goods -0.52 -0.53 -0.55 -0.53
Error correction term Alpha values   t-stat Alpha values   t-stat Alpha values   t-stat Alpha values   t-stat
   Cash Capital Flows -0.73 -8.7 -0.74 -8.7 -0.69 -8.7 -0.69 -8.7
   Interest rate differential 0.00 -0.3 0.00 -0.3 0.00 -0.3 0.00 -0.3
      (36 months loans)
   Imports of capital goods 0.03 0.6 0.04 0.7 0.04 0.6 0.04 0.7
Exogenous dummies   t-stat t-stat   t-stat   t-stat
March 1992 - June1992 27.94 0.7 34.17 0.8
October 1993 - January 1994 46.27 1.1 53.82 1.3 51.95 1.3
April 1994 - July 1994 -2.56 -0.1
September 1994 - December 1994 75.80 1.9 69.79 1.7 82.42 2.0 83.49 2.0
January 1995 - January 1996 -118.02 -4.5 -123.04 -4.8 -113.56 -4.4 -112.51 -4.4
February 1996 - December 1996 6.94 0.3
May 1997 - December 1997 -45.34 -1.5 -51.40 -1.7 -51.34 -1.6 -51.03 -1.6
December 1996 825.87 10.0 822.99 10.3 844.44 10.5 842.20 10.5
Constant -53.31 -4.7 -53.09 -4.9 -51.98 -4.5 -49.55 -4.6












































































(millions of US dollars)
Estimated effects of interest rate
differentials using Kalman filter
a
(millions of US dollars)
Excluding Including Net effect Excluding Including Net effect Excluding Including Net effect
deposits deposits of deposits deposits deposits of deposits deposits deposits of deposits
 January 1990 - February 1992 1.3 5.8 4.5
 March 1992 - September 1993 7.0 32.2 24.9
 October 1993 - March 1994 9.8 6.1 3.7 45.2 28.2 17.0 32.7 20.4 12.3
 April 1994 - August 1994 16.4 4.2 12.2 75.9 19.7 56.3 56.5 14.6 41.9
 September 1994 - January 1996 15.2 -0.8 16.0 70.4 -3.8 74.1 62.2 -3.3 65.5
 February 1996 - December 1996 9.5 2.6 6.9 43.9 11.8 32.1 56.0 15.1 40.9
 January 1997 - March 1997 16.1 4.4 11.6 74.3 20.5 53.8 138.4 38.2 100.3
 April 1997 - May 1997 16.7 8.2 8.5 77.3 38.1 39.2 150.0 73.9 76.1
 June 1997 - December 1998 0.9 -4.1 5.0 4.1 -19.0 23.1 7.7 -36.1 43.8
 January 1998 - December 1998 -0.3 -4.1 3.8 -1.5 -19.0 17.5 -2.6 -32.6 30.0
a Estimates based on equation 2 from table 4.CEPAL – SERIE Financiamiento del desarrollo  N
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The tests for the temporary and discrete effects of different policy decisions 
20 indicate that
there were some stock adjustments following the February 1992 and September 1993
liberalizations, but the results are statistically weak. They also indicate that a strong speculative
wave prior to the August 1994 decision generated record registrations, leading to sizable undesired
inflows through the rest of the year. However, the August 1994 control measures also had a delayed
direct effect, which reduced capital inflows by over US$100 million per month from January 1995
to January 1996. The net effect of these measures was to reduce capital flows by US$1.1 to 1.3
billion during the 17 months they were in effect. If these effects are added to those caused by the
additional costs of borrowing (table 5), the total effect is quite sizable: US$2.6 billion during the 17-
month period. Results also suggest significant discrete effects from the May 1997 regulation, of
about US$50 million per month.
As an alternative exercise to estimate the effects of capital flow controls, we applied a
Kalman filter to equation (1). Figure 4 graphically displays the effects of interest rate differentials
for 36-month loans, both excluding and including the coefficient obtained for the constant (panels A
and B, respectively). Capital account regulations were effective in reducing capital inflows when
regulations were made more restrictive (particularly in August 1994, January 1997 and May 1997),
which is consistent with the increases in capital flows following the easing of regulations (February-
March 1996 and January 1998).
21 This effect results from factors other than the price-based
regulations. However, as shown in panel C of figure 4, which compares the estimated effects of
interest rate differentials including and excluding the cost of deposits, the effect is largely
attributable to capital account regulations, since the difference among series is mainly determined
by the cost of the deposits.
The estimated effects of interest rate differentials, using the Kalman filter methodology,
follows the same dynamics as that found using cointegration analysis (see table 5). The main
difference occurs in the short period when the explicit Tobin tax was in place, for which the Kalman
filters estimate a stronger effect (a reduction of capital inflows by US$100 million per month).
These results indicate that price-based capital controls were effective in reducing the volume
of capital inflows, both due to the increased costs of shorter-term borrowing and to the discrete
effects of regulations, associated to the imperfect substitution of borrowing at different maturities.
In particular, the strict August 1994 controls (with a lag related to speculative behavior before the
regulations were introduced) and the January and May 1997 restrictions had the expected effects.
The results also indicate that temporary stock adjustments may have taken place following the
February 1992 and September 1993 liberalizations.
                                                          
20 Only dummy variables with the expected signs are included in the results presented here.
21 The substitution of the January 1997 explicit Tobin tax by stronger capital account regulations in March 1997 had a net liberalization
effect, according to these estimates.Price-based capital account regulations: the Colombian experience
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Figure 4
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF PRICE-BASED CAPITAL CONTROL
ON CASH CAPITAL FLOWS
A. Effects of interest rate differentials
(Constant excluded – millions of US dollars)
B. Effects of interest rate differentials
 (Constant included – millions of US dollars)
C. Effects of interest rate differentials excluding and including
         costs of forced deposits
            (Constant included – millions of US dollars)
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V. The term structure of external
borrowing
Regulations have also been effective in determining the term
structure of private borrowing. Table 6 presents data on registrations
of new debt contracted with foreign financial institutions in
1994-1998. As shown, maturities clearly increased as a result of the
March and August 1994 regulations, which raised the minimum
maturity for deposit-free loans from 18 months to three years and from
three to five years, respectively. This is also true of the March 1997
regulations, which again increased minimum maturities from three to
five years. The return to a three-year minimum maturity in March 1996
had the opposite effect. Also, the flat tax introduced in May 1997 was
not a perfect substitute for the system based on minimum maturities; it
thus led to a relative reduction in longer-term borrowing, which
became increasingly clear when the deposit rate was reduced in 1998.
Most of the short-term debt (i.e., less than six months and some export
financing at 7 to 18 months) is associated with import and export
financing, which has been free from deposit requirements or has had
smaller deposit requirements since March 1996.
These results raise the interesting question of whether the term
structure is exclusively determined by relative costs or whether
regulations on minimum maturities are also important. Table 7
presents the share of medium-term loans (37-60 months) and long-term
loans (more than 60 months) on the basis of the corresponding regime
(captured by dummy variables) and the relative costs of borrowing.
The results indicate that the regime is a crucial determinant of the
share of long-term borrowing. In this regard, the May 1997 change
from minimum loan maturities to a  flat tax was not neutral in  terms ofPrice-based capital account regulations: the Colombian experience
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the term structure of external borrowing. In contrast, the relative costs of borrowing, rather the
regime, seem to be the major determinant of the share of medium-term borrowing.
Table 6
EXTERNAL DEBT REGISTRATIONS WITH FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
ACCORDING TO LOAN MATURITIES
Monthly averages Maturity in months
0-6 7-18 19-36 37-60 More than 60 Total
A.- Values (millions of US
dollars)
1994
January - March 3.1 1.2 346.6 83.9 8.6 443.4
April - August 12.6 22.2 52.2 170.7 33.9 291.6
September - December 13.0 12.2 9.3 13.7 179.5 227.6
1995
January -December 48.2 27.3 9.2 8.5 277.6 370.7
1996
January-March 13.6 15.9 8.4 9.6 219.2 266.7
April - December 83.4 33.4 345.9 138.4 629.2
1997
January - March 68.2 10.4 6.1 118.5 100.6 303.8
April - May 129.2 18.8 8.2 40.3 201.5 397.8
June - December 64.6 48.3 15.0 74.6 117.6 320.1
1998
January - August 70.7 38.3 13.1 21.4 34.1 177.6
September - December 45.3 35.8 20.9 72.1 32.6 206.7
B.- As % of Total
1994
January - March 0.7 0.3 78.2 18.9 1.9 100.0
April - August 4.3 7.6 17.9 58.5 11.6 100.0
September - December 5.7 5.3 4.1 6.0 78.9 100.0
1995
January -December 13.0 7.4 2.5 2.3 74.9 100.0
1996
January-March 5.1 6.0 3.1 3.6 82.2 100.0
April - December 13.3 5.3 0.0 55.0 22.0 100.0
1997
January - March 22.4 3.4 2.0 39.0 33.1 100.0
April - May 32.5 4.7 2.0 10.1 50.6 100.0
June - December 20.2 15.1 4.7 23.3 36.7 100.0
1998
January - August 39.8 21.6 7.4 12.1 19.2 100.0
September - December 21.9 17.3 10.1 34.9 15.8 100.0




ESTIMATED DETERMINANTS OF THE TERM STRUCTURE OF
PRIVATE CAPITAL INFLOWS











Minimum maturity of three years 0.0869 0.1481
(0.73) (1.07)
Minimum maturity of five years -0.1925 * 0.5088 **
(-1.61) (3.50)
Restriction based on flat tax on all loans -0.129 0.1568
(June 1997 - September 1998) (-1.09) (1.15)
Relative cost of medium- vs. 0.2962 **
 short-term debt (2.79)
Relative cost of long-term vs.  0.1219
 medium-term debt (1.00)
R
2 0.30 0.39
D.W. statistic 0.65 0.82
* Statistically different from zero at 90% confidence level.




The econometric evidence presented in this paper indicates that
price-based capital account regulations have been effective in
Colombia during the 1990s, in terms of both reducing the volume of
capital flows and improving the term structure of external borrowing.
The effects on the volume of external borrowing are due to the
additional costs that deposits (or reserve requirements) impose on the
cost of borrowing, as well as to discrete effects of the regulations. The
latter are interpreted as the result of the imperfect substitution of
longer-term versus shorter-term borrowing. Price-based regulations
thus give the authorities leeway to adopt restrictive monetary policies
during international capital market booms.
The evidence provided also indicates that the relative cost of
borrowing is crucial in determining the share of medium-term (36-60
months) versus shorter-term loans, but that the regime is the basic
determinant of longer-term borrowing. In this regard, the system used
in Colombia since May 1997, based on a flat reserve requirement on
all loans, although simpler to administer, is not a perfect substitute for
that used between September 1993 and May 1997, based on reserve
requirements for loans with a certain minimum maturity. In any case,
through either of the two channels discussed, the price-based
regulations have improved the debt profile of the country, which is a
crucial determinant of macroeconomic risks in the face of sudden busts




Costs of borrowing in foreign currencies
with deposits


















where r is deposit rate, td the time they have to be held, d
e the expected
rate of devaluation, and i the domestic interest rate. q = 1 if deposits are
dollar-denominated (Sept. 1993-May 1997) and q = 0 if they are peso-
denominated.
Since the deposit and credit periods do not necessarily coincide, it
is easier to estimate the future value of the loan per dollar borrowed (Lf),
including the future value of deposits:
(A2) () ( ) [] ()
tc tc e i C d i Lf + + + + = 1 1 1
* q
where i* is the external interest rate and tc the credit period. From (A2),
we can obtain the total annual costs of the loan (j):
(A3) ()1
/ 1 - =
tc Lf j
The precise expression for j can be derived from equations (A1) to
(A3).
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